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GALLEON ENTERPRISES INC., 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the United States District Court 
for the District of New Union.  The district court sat in both admiralty and 
federal statutory jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 (2008).  Appellate jurisdiction in this Court arises under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I.  Whether the wreck referred to as La Contesta is protected by the 
SMCA. 
II.  Whether the shipwreck is subject to sovereign immunity and, if so, 
whether salvage requires the consent of the sovereign. 
III.  Whether NOAA properly refused to issue Galleon a permit to 
excavate and recover portions of a historical shipwreck within the 
GCNMS. 
IV.  Whether the sunken ship and cargo, both inside and outside the 
boundaries of the GCNMS, may not be recovered without an 
NMSA permit. 
V.  Whether the Secretary of Commerce properly denied Galleon an 
Endangered Species permit to drill through endangered deep sea 
coral within a national marine sanctuary. 
VI.  Whether Galleon’s salvage operations are illegal without permit 
authorization by the COE or EPA. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The instant action was initiated by Galleon Enterprises, Inc. 
(“Galleon”), with the filing of a verified in rem complaint in admiralty 
against the shipwreck known as La Contesta.  Galleon sought (1) title to La 
Contesta under the Law of Finds; (2) in the alternative, a liberal salvage 
award for voluntarily recovering artifacts; (3) declaratory judgment that 
Spain no longer exercises its sovereign prerogative over the wrecked vessel; 
and (4) declaratory judgment that the Executive Branch of the United States 
has no jurisdiction to regulate salvage operations with respect to La 
Contesta. 
The Kingdom of Spain answered by filing a verified claim, and the 
United States intervened.  A trial was held on all issues raised by all three 
parties.  The district court held that (1) the SMCA does not apply to La 
Contesta because the vessel is not a sunken military craft; (2) Galleon 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/15
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cannot obtain title to the shipwreck under the Law of Finds because Spain 
had not abandoned title thereto; (3) Galleon is entitled to salvage award 
equivalent to 90% of value of artifacts recovered outside boundaries of the 
GCNMS under the Law of Salvage, but is precluded from salvage within 
the GCNMS because of its failures to comply with permitting requirements 
of NOAA and the Corps; (4) Galleon violated both RHA and CWA 
permitting requirements with respect to activities within the GCNMS; (5) 
cargo found outside of the GCNMS is segregable from cargo found within, 
and Galleon is enjoined from conducting research or recovery activities 
within the GSNMS without permits from NOAA and the Corps; and (6) the 
Secretary of Commerce acted properly in denying permit to Galleon to drill 
through coral reefs to reach La Contesta. 
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court, all parties 
timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1733, the Spanish frigate Nuestra Senora La Contesta de Aragon 
(La Contesta) was driven off course by a hurricane and wrecked, with 
nearly half its fleet, on the coral reefs surrounding what is now New Union.  
(R. at 4.)  A second hurricane shortly after the initial wreck broke apart the 
remnants of the ships and terminated salvage efforts.  (R. at 5.)  La Contesta 
had traveled from Spain to Peru as one of six frigates protecting a fleet of 
merchant galleons from attack.  (R. at 5.)  As it escorted the galleons back 
to Spain, La Contesta also carried mail, passengers, and cargo, including 
$500 million in gold and silver coins and bullion.  (R. at 4.)  The National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) established the 
Gold Coast National Marine Sanctuary (GCNMS) to protect these historical 
Spanish shipwrecks and the natural resources of the submerged lands in 
which they lie buried.  (R. at 5.) 
In 2008, Galleon Enterprises, Inc. (Galleon) discovered artifacts from 
an ancient shipwreck inside and slightly outside the GCNMS, within the 
contiguous zone of the United States.  (R. at 3.)  The sunken vessel that is 
the source of the artifacts lies inside the marine sanctuary, embedded in 
coral formations.  Id.; (R. at 6.)  All evidence points to the wreck being of 
Spanish origin.  (R. at 12.)  Hoping to profit from the wreck by recovering 
its cargo, Galleon applied to NOAA for a Research and Recovery permit 
that would legalize certain recovery activities inside the GCNMS.  (R. at 6.)  
Based upon the evidence Galleon presented, NOAA concluded the sunken 
ship was a Spanish vessel and Galleon would need Spain’s express consent 
before NOAA could issue a permit for excavation or recovery of any 
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portion of the wreck.  When Galleon failed to prove Spain’s consent, 
NOAA denied the permit application.  Id. 
Disregarding NOAA’s denial of its permit application, Galleon began 
excavation and recovery of the Spanish vessel and its cargo, both inside and 
outside the GCNMS.  Id.  Galleon used devices called “mailboxes” to direct 
the propeller wash of its ship straight downward, blasting away the seabed 
of the marine sanctuary and uncovering artifacts.  Galleon also constructed 
an illegal drilling platform inside the sanctuary and attempted to access the 
sunken ship itself by drilling through the endangered deep sea coral 
believed to cover it.  Id.  Galleon removed artifacts from inside and outside 
the Marine Sanctuary and brought them before the court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Sunken Military Craft Act applies to La Contesta because La 
Contesta is a sunken Spanish military craft to which Spain retains title.  The 
SMCA, when read consistently with treaties and customary international 
law, does not require warships to have been on noncommercial service at 
their time of sinking.  Spain has also not abandoned or transferred its title to 
La Contesta because Spain must do so expressly, and it has instead 
expressly stated that it has not in any manner relinquished its title to sunken 
vessels lost in its service.  As such, the SMCA conveys Spanish sovereign 
immunity to La Contesta, and prevents Galleon from asserting the Law of 
Salvage without consent of the sovereign.  Alternatively, the 1902 Treaty of 
Friendship and General Relations does the same for all sunken Spanish 
vessels, not merely warships. 
NOAA’s denial of Galleon’s application for a Research and Recovery 
permit for the Spanish wreck was not arbitrary or capricious.  Rather, 
NOAA has full discretion under the NMSA to grant or deny permit 
applications, and denial of Galleon’s permit was proper in order to uphold 
the United States’s commitments to the Sunken Military Craft Act and the 
1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations.  Galleon’s salvage 
activities have a devastating effect on the shipwreck site, which is a 
sanctuary historical resource protected by the NMSA, and the sanctuary 
resources of the surrounding marine environment.  Without a permit to 
conduct these activities, Galleon’s actions both inside and outside the 
sanctuary are prohibited. Finally, the Secretary of Commerce did not act 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Galleon an Endangered Species Act 
permit to drill through endangered deep sea coral.  Because drilling through 
this coral was prohibited by GCNMS regulations, it was not an “otherwise 
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lawful” activity, one of the explicit requirements for incidental take permits 
under the ESA. 
Galleon needs permits from both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to salvage La Contesta.  
The Rivers and Harbors Act requires that Galleon obtain a permit from the 
Corps of Engineers.  Galleon’s drilling platform is a structure and an 
obstruction that interferes with the navigability of the navigable waters of 
the United States.  Concurrently, the Clean Water Act established two 
permitting schemes, one under the authority of the Corps of Engineers and 
the other under the Environmental Protection Agency, and both permits 
apply to Galleon’s salvage operations of La Contesta.  Galleon’s mailbox 
and drilling operations constitute the addition of pollutants in the form of 
seabed sediment and seagrasses (dredged materials regulated by the Corps 
under § 404 of the CWA) and coral (biological materials that require 
permitting from the EPA through the NPDES under § 402 of the CWA) into 
the waters of the United States.  Additionally, Galleon’s drilling platform is 
not a vessel exempted from CWA coverage in the contiguous zone and 
instead constitutes a conveyance that is a point source for discharging 
pollutants. 
ARGUMENT 
As a threshold matter, the sunken vessel and the cargo are the same 
entity, the shipwreck.  “Shipwreck” means a vessel or wreck, its cargo, and 
other contents. 43 U.S.C. § 2102(d) (2006).  This interpretation is consistent 
with the common principle of admiralty jurisdiction that in an in rem action, 
a court gains jurisdiction over the res, the property named as defendant, by 
seizing and actually controlling the res. Great Lakes Exploration Group, 
LLC v. Unidentified Wrecked & (For Salvage-Right Purposes), Abandoned 
Sailing Vessel, 522 F.3d 682, 694 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing R.M.S. Titanic, 
Inc., v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 964 (4th Cir.1999)).  To obtain possession 
over the res, district courts sitting in admiralty may issue a warrant of arrest 
for a physical part of a shipwreck (an “artifact”) and, based on this arrest, 
exercise constructive jurisdiction over the entire shipwreck. Id. (citing 3A-
X Benedict on Admiralty § 137 (2007)).  If such cargo as a bottle of 
champagne is sufficient to represent the entirety of a shipwreck, see 
California v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491, 496 (1998) (recognizing a 
court’s in rem admiralty jurisdiction on the basis that the salvor presented 
artifacts from the shipwreck, including china and a bottle of champagne), 
the wreck and its cargo must necessarily be presumed a single, contiguous 
5
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entity unless proven otherwise (in which case there must be additional 
defendants in the in rem action). 
I. THE SUNKEN MILITARY CRAFT ACT APPLIES TO LA 
CONTESTA BECAUSE LA CONTESTA IS A SUNKEN 
SPANISH MILITARY CRAFT TO WHICH SPAIN 
RETAINS TITLE. 
The Sunken Military Craft Act (“SMCA”), Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 
Stat. 2094 (2004),  prohibits the disturbance, without authorization by 
permit from the Secretary of the Navy, of any (A) sunken military craft 
where (B) title thereto has not been abandoned or transferred by its 
government operator.  Although the district court correctly found that Spain 
retained title to La Contesta, its erroneous interpretation of the SMCA 
caused it to find that La Contesta was not a sunken military craft.  Because 
statutory construction is reviewed de novo, the district court’s interpretation 
is accorded no appellate deference, and for the following reasons, its 
holding that the SMCA does not apply to La Contesta should be reversed. 
A.   La Contesta is a Sunken Military Craft Because it was a Warship, 
and the SMCA Does Not Require Warships to Have Been on 
Noncommercial Service at Their Time of Sinking. 
The SMCA defines “sunken military craft” to include any and all 
portions of “any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or other vessel that was 
owned or operated by a government on military noncommercial service 
when it sank.” Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1408(3), 118 Stat. 2094, 2097 
(2004).  The craft includes all associated contents, id., which include the 
cargo and contents of the craft with its debris field. Id. at  § 1408(1).  The 
district court correctly interpreted the statute with respect to the residual 
element of § 1408(3)(A), that any “other vessel” is subject to the 
requirement of ownership or operation by a government on military 
noncommercial service at time of sinking.  However, the court incorrectly 
interpreted this requirement of noncommercial service to apply to warships.  
The plain ordinary meaning of warship is “[a] ship commissioned by a 
nation’s military, operating with a military command and crew and 
displaying the nation’s flag or other external marks indicating its country of 
origin.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).  Although Congress may 
have contemplated that a warship might serve in a nonmilitary commercial 
capacity, and thereby be excluded from the protection of SMCA, both (1) 
treaties and (2) customary international law suggest that warships are 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/15
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distinct from other vessels to which the noncommercial requirement 
applies. 
1. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, to which the 
United States is a party, distinguishes between warships and 
other vessels on noncommercial service. 
The SMCA must be applied in accordance with treaties to which the 
United States is a party. Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1406(b); see also U.S. 
Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.  The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 
(“GCOHS”) was ratified by the United States, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), and 
holds that “‘warship’ means a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State 
and bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, 
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government 
and whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who are 
under regular naval discipline.” Id. at Art. 8.  The GCOHS makes a 
distinction from mere ships “owned or operated by a State and used only on 
government noncommercial service.” Id. at Art. 9.  The district court’s 
construction of SMCA § 1408(3) is inconsistent with the clear delineation 
in the GCOHS between warships in general and other vessels on 
noncommercial service.  An application of § 1408(3) that is consistent with 
the GCOHS requires that warships such as La Contesta be afforded 
protection under the SMCA, as they are under the GCOHS, regardless of 
the nature of their service at the time of sinking. 
2. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the 
United States considers customary international law, makes the 
same distinction. 
Generally recognized principles of international law are incorporated 
into the SMCA. Pub. L. No. 108-375 § 1406(b); see also RMS Titanic, Inc. 
v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1999) (stressing that a court sitting 
in admiralty jurisdiction defers to international maritime law and the 
common law of the seas) (citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581 
(1953)).  Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”), “‘warship’ means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a 
State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, 
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of 
the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its 
equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces 
discipline.” 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (1994), Art. 29.  UNCLOS makes the same 
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distinction as the GCOHS between warships and other ships. Compare id. at 
Art. 95 (discussing the immunity of warships on the high seas) with id. at 
Art. 96 (discussing the immunity of “ships used only on government non-
commercial service” on the high seas).  Although the United States has not 
ratified UNCLOS, these commonly accepted concepts in admiralty form the 
understanding of SMCA by its own military and Department of Homeland 
Security services. See United States Coast Guard Shipwreck Policy, 
http://www.uscg.mil/history/faqs/USCG_Shipwreck_Policy.asp (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2008) (“Throughout history, warships and other craft in the 
service of the government have been accorded special protection under the 
concept of sovereign immunity, which exempts a warship or other 
governmental vessel in noncommercial service from the jurisdiction of any 
other state. In the modern era, this doctrine has been accepted as customary 
law by the courts in most jurisdictions as well as having been memorialized 
in articles 95 and 96 of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention.”). 
B.  Spain Has Not Abandoned or Transferred Its Title to La Contesta 
because Spain Must Do so Expressly and It Has Instead Expressly 
Stated That It Has Not in Any Manner Relinquished Its Title to 
Sunken Vessels Lost in Its Service. 
Under traditional rules of admiralty law, abandonment must be shown 
by express acts where an owner asserts title to a shipwreck. Sea Hunt, Inc. 
v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 
2000) (citing Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 
F.2d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1144 (2001); see also 
Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel, 162 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(even where a vessel has been abandoned, title still remains with the 
original owner) (citing 3A Martin J. Norris, Benedict on Admiralty, § 150, 
at 11-1 (1997)).  Even where courts have questioned this rule and inferred 
abandonment, their holdings have been limited to vessels originally owned 
by private parties. Id. at 642 (citing Fairport Int’l Exploration, Inc. v. 
Shipwrecked Vessel, 177 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 1999)).  Spanish vessels 
are further protected by Article X of the 1902 Treaty between the United 
States and Spain of Friendship and General Relations (“1902 Treaty”). See 
33 Stat. 2105 (1903) (“In cases of shipwreck, damages at sea, or forced 
putting in, each party shall afford to the vessels of the other, whether 
belonging to the State or to individuals, the same assistance and protection 
and the same immunities which would have been granted to its own vessels 
in similar cases.”).  The 1902 Treaty grants immunities to Spanish vessels 
that the United States shares with no other foreign state. Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/15
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at 642 (internal citation omitted).  Among these immunities is that the 
United States cannot abandon or relinquish its property, including vessels, 
without an “express, unambiguous, and affirmative act.” Id. (citing U.S. 
Const. art. IV, § 3; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947)).  
“Under the terms of the 1902 Treaty, Spanish vessels can likewise be 
abandoned only by express renunciation.” Id. at 643. 
The district court found as a matter of fact that the shipwreck is 
Spanish, thereby triggering the protection of the 1902 Treaty and the 
immunities that it incorporates. See Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 642-43.  The 
court also found that Spain had never abandoned or transferred its title in 
the craft, actions which would nullify SMCA protection. See Pub. L. No. 
108-375, § 1408(3).  The Secretary of State invited the Kingdom of Spain 
to join in the SMCA, see id. at § 1407, and Spain requested SMCA 
protection for its sunken military craft. 69 Fed. Reg. 5647 (Feb. 5, 2004) 
(“[R]egarding the remains of sunken vessels that were lost while in the 
service of the Kingdom of Spain and/or were transporting property of the 
Kingdom of Spain . . . Spain has not abandoned or otherwise relinquished 
its ownership or other interests with respect to such vessels and/or its 
contents.”).  Therefore, title to La Contesta remains with Spain, and the 
SMCA applies to the shipwreck. 1 
 
 1.  If this Court treats the issue of the 1902 Treaty as one first raised on appeal, it 
should nonetheless resolve the matter within its discretion. See Turner v. City of Memphis, 
369 U.S. 350, 353 (1962) (“On the merits, no issue remains to be resolved. This is clear 
under prior decisions and the undisputed facts of the case. Accordingly no occasion is 
presented for abstention, and the litigation should be disposed of as expeditiously as is 
consistent with proper judicial administration.”).  “The matter of what questions may be 
taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the 
courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases” with respect to the need 
for developing evidence and preventing injustice. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 
(1976) (citing Turner); see also Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-57 (1941) (purpose 
of district court is to serve as forum for development of all evidence to relevant issues, but 
where arguments raised for the first time before appellate court concern solely questions of 
law rather than of fact, appellate court should not be so rigid in refusing to adjudicate those 
questions where justice would be served); Wagenknecht v. United States, 533 F.3d 412, 418 
(6th Cir. 2008) (“A federal appellate court can resolve an issue not passed on below where 
the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or where injustice might otherwise result.”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted); Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1140 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“The panel need not consider arguments not before the district court unless 
review is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process . . . or the issue is purely 
one of law and does not depend on the factual record below.” (citing Bolker v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985)).  The Courts of Appeals adjudicate 
new arguments to prevent such injustice, Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 533 F.3d 857, 867 
(D.C. Cir. 2008), and review them for plain error. Bath Junkie Branson, LLC v. Bath Junkie, 
Inc., 528 F.3d 556, 561 (8th Cir. 2008) (where there is “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) 
that affects substantial rights” and if “(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 
9
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II. SPANISH SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY APPLIES TO LA 
CONTESTA AND PREVENTS GALLEON FROM 
ASSERTING THE LAW OF SALVAGE WITHOUT 
CONSENT FROM THE SOVEREIGN. 
Sovereign immunity, as applied to property, is the extension of a 
sovereign entity’s immunity from challenge to its interests and title in that 
property, unless such immunity is waived. See Block v. N.D. ex rel. Bd. of 
Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 285, 287 (1983).  As detailed supra at 
Sec. I(B) of this brief, one example of such immunity is that the sovereign’s 
title can only be expressly abandoned.  Immunities may also be conferred 
by statute, and depending on the particular statute that this court chooses to 
apply, La Contesta (A) is subject to the sovereign immunity of Spain, and 
(B) may not be salvaged without the consent of that sovereign.  
Additionally, (C) consent of the United States through statutory permitting 
schemes is required regardless of sovereign immunity. 
A.   The Shipwreck Is Subject to the Sovereign Immunity of Spain. 
Depending on this Court’s holding with respect to the first question 
presented, La Contesta is subject to the sovereign immunity of Spain as 
conveyed by either (1) the SMCA or (2) the 1902 Treaty. 
 
1. The SMCA conveys the sovereign immunity of Spain upon all 
sunken Spanish warships. 
The SMCA grants sovereign immunity to the crafts to which it applies.  
See Fathom Exploration, LLC v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or 
Vessels, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 n.16 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (noting with 
regard to a sunken vessel that the United States claimed under the SMCA, 
“[t]o the extent, then, that the Shipwreck is United States property which 
the United States has not abandoned, Fathom conducts salvage operations 
on that site at its own risk.”).  Therefore, if this Court held that La Contesta 
 
public reputation of the judicial proceeding.”).  The United States’ treaty obligation to the 
Kingdom of Spain would be violated in a wholly unjust manner if the judgment of the 
district court were not reversed or at least vacated and remanded for consideration.  This is 
solely a “question[] of law, the proper resolution of which [is] beyond reasonable doubt, and 
the failure to address the issue[] would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Habecker v. Town 
of Estes Park, 518 F.3d 1217, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008).  Nor would this Court be alone in 
specifically considering claims arising under the 1902 Treaty. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l 
Terminal Operating Co., 244 F.2d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (addressing 
invocation of 1902 Treaty on the merits, where claim was first made on appeal). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/15
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is subject to the SMCA, then the SMCA conveys the sovereign immunity of 
Spain upon the shipwreck. 
2. The 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations conveys 
Spanish sovereign immunity upon all sunken Spanish vessels. 
If this Court does not find that La Contesta is a sunken warship upon 
which the SMCA conveys Spanish sovereign immunity, sovereign 
immunity is nonetheless granted by Article X of the 1902 Treaty between 
the United States and Spain of Friendship and General Relations. See 33 
Stat. 2105 (1903) (“In cases of shipwreck, damages at sea, or forced putting 
in, each party shall afford to the vessels of the other, whether belonging to 
the State or to individuals, the same assistance and protection and the same 
immunities which would have been granted to its own vessels in similar 
cases.”); see also Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or 
Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 642 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1144 
(2001).  The treaty covers all vessels, not merely warships or vessels on any 
particular service, commercial or otherwise. See 33 Stat. 2105; see also, 
e.g., Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 47 F. 
Supp. 2d 678, 680 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“Although there is a factual dispute 
between the parties as to whether the JUNO and LA GALGA are warships, 
that question is immaterial and does not prevent the Court from ruling on 
the [applicability of the 1902 Treaty].”).  It is also irrelevant that La 
Contesta was sunken in 1733, before the existence of the United States as a 
sovereign nation. See Sea Hunt, 221 F.3d at 639 (noting that La Galga sank 
in 1750). 
The district court found that the in rem defendant is a Spanish 
shipwreck, a factual conclusion that is accorded deference on appeal.  
Therefore, the 1902 Treaty conveys the sovereign immunity of Spain upon 
La Contesta.2 
 
 2.  Alternatively, if this Court finds that La Contesta is abandoned or alternatively that 
the wreck was never Spanish or otherwise sovereign at any time, there is a colorable 
argument that the shipwreck is subject to the sovereign immunity of the United States as an 
abandoned shipwreck in federal waters.  The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (“ASA”) 
provides that “[a]ny abandoned shipwreck in or on the public lands of the United States is 
the property of the United States Government.” 43 U.S.C. § 2105(d); see also 43 U.S.C. § 
2102(c) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(3)(B) (defining “public lands” as lands to which the 
United States holds fee title, with exceptions that do not herein apply)); Fathom Exploration, 
LLC v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1223 n.4 (S.D. 
Ala. 2005) (“The ASA specifically reserves to the United States title in all shipwrecks . . . in 
federal waters.”).  United States title may be reinforced by the fact that La Contesta is 
embedded in the soil of the seabed, land which belongs to the United States. See Klein v. 
11
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B.  The Consent of Spain Is Required for Galleon to Obtain Any 
Salvage Award. 
Under the SMCA, “[n]o salvage rights or awards shall be granted with 
respect to . . . any foreign sunken military craft located in United States 
waters without the express permission of the relevant foreign state.” Pub. L. 
No. 108-375, § 1406(d).  United States waters include the contiguous zone 
of the United States, § 1408(7), which are the areas radiating seaward and 
between twelve and twenty-four nautical miles away from the United States 
coastline. § 1408(4) (citing Presidential Proclamation 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 
48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999)).  If this court holds that the SMCA subjects La 
Contesta to the sovereign immunity of Spain, then the express consent of 
Spain is necessary for Galleon to acquire salvage rights to La Contesta, and 
Galleon must be denied all salvage award because it has failed to elicit 
Spain’s consent. 
Alternatively, “[u]nder the doctrine of salvage, an owner in possession 
of a vessel may refuse proffered help and thereby deny a salvage claim to 
the would-be salvor.” United States v. Ex-USS Cabot/Dedalo, 297 F.3d 
378, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Merritt & Chapman Derrick & 
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 611, 613 (1927)).  Spain, which 
retains title to La Contesta, has expressly refused Galleon’s offer of 
salvage.  Therefore, Galleon’s salvage claim must be denied.3 
 
Unidentified, Wrecked, & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985).  
The Kingdom of Spain does not endorse this argument insofar as its application necessitates 
a finding that Spain does not currently hold title to La Contesta. 
 3.  Concurrently, regardless of the applicability of sovereign immunity to La Contesta, 
Galleon requires a number of permits from the United States to conduct its salvage 
operations without forfeiting any possible salvage award.  Permitting schemes may restrict 
or even practically prohibit Galleon’s lawful salvage of the shipwreck. See Lathrop v. 
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953, 963 (M.D. Fla. 1993) 
(“Plaintiff would not prevail on a salvage claim because he cannot lawfully gain possession 
of the alleged vessel without first obtaining a permit from the United States.”).  As detailed 
supra in Sec. VI of this brief, Galleon is required to obtaining a number of permits to ensure 
that its salvage operations do not negatively impact the environmental soundness of the 
waters.  Therefore, Galleon has no salvage claim until it has obtained those permits. See id. 
at 964 (“When Plaintiff obtains a permit, Plaintiff's salvage activities and recovery of 
artifacts will be deemed lawful.”). 
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III. NOAA’S DECISION TO DENY GALLEON A NATIONAL 
MARINE SANCTUARY RESEARCH AND RECOVERY 
PERMIT UNDER THE NMSA WAS SUPPORTED BY 
GOOD CAUSE, AND THEREFORE WAS NOT 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
The National Marine Sanctuary Act (NMSA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 
(2008), grants the Secretary of Commerce authority to designate and 
manage marine areas of special national significance as national marine 
sanctuaries.  The primary purpose of the NMSA is to protect “sanctuary 
resources;” “any living or nonliving resource[s] of a national marine 
sanctuary that [contribute] to the conservation, recreational, ecological, 
historical, educational, cultural, archeological, scientific, or aesthetic value 
of the sanctuary.”  Id. § 1432(8).  Historic shipwrecks are sanctuary 
resources.  15 C.F.R. § 922.3 (2008); see id. § 922.60. 
The Secretary of Commerce has delegated his duties under the NMSA 
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which 
now regulates marine sanctuaries.  S. Rep. No. 595, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4387-88.  The Gold Coast National Marine Sanctuary (GCNMS) was 
established pursuant to the NMSA to include the submerged lands in which 
a group of sunken Spanish ships are buried and to protect the natural and 
historical resources of these lands, including the shipwreck in this case.  (R. 
at 5); see (R. at 3.) 
In reviewing an agency decision, a court may set the decision aside 
only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 702(2)(A) (2006).  The court must 
inquire whether the agency “considered the relevant factors and articulated 
a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”  
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th 
Cir. 1990).  This standard of review is deferential, and a court will “uphold 
a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be 
discerned.”  Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  In this case, NOAA acted according to proper 
procedure under broad discretion granted by the NMSA, and its decision 
that there existed good cause to deny Galleon’s permit was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious. 
13
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A.  NOAA Properly Denied Galleon’s Permit In Order to Ensure 
Compliance with Other Laws and Treaties of the United States. 
Before acting on an NMSA permit application, NOAA may request 
additional information from a permit applicant and seek the views of “any 
persons or entity within or outside the Federal government”; NOAA may 
then issue a permit or deny issuance for good cause. 15 C.F.R. §§ 
922.48(c)-(d) (2008).  Consistent with this authority, NOAA’s action in the 
present case constituted both a request for additional information from 
Galleon – whether or not Spain consented to Galleon’s proposed salvage – 
and an indirect inquiry, through Galleon, into the views of Spain on the 
potential permit issuance.  NOAA acted properly, following express 
Congressional authority, in reviewing Galleon’s permit application. 
Once NOAA learned that Spain did not consent to Galleon’s recovery 
plan, it denied Galleon’s Research and Recovery permit application for 
good cause: in order to ensure Agency compliance with the SMCA and the 
1902 Treaty.  Pub. L. 108-375, 118 Stat. 2094 (2004); 33 Stat. 2105 (1903).  
Although the NMSA does not define “good cause” as used in Section 
922.48(d) and no standard for good cause has been established in NMSA 
case law, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “good cause” as “a legally 
sufficient reason.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).  Adherence to 
the laws and treaties of the United States plainly constitutes “a legally 
sufficient reason” for NOAA to deny a permit application. 
NOAA denied Galleon’s permit application in order to ensure 
compliance with the SMCA.  A Research and Recovery permit issued by 
NOAA would authorize Galleon to move, remove, and possess sanctuary 
historical resources from the GCNMS, including items from the Spanish 
wreck.  Issuance of a Research and Recovery permit to Galleon would 
therefore constitute the grant of a salvage right by NOAA.  Because the 
SMCA applies with full force to the shipwreck in this case, issuance of a 
Research and Recovery permit by NOAA without Spain’s consent would 
violate the SMCA provision that “[n]o salvage rights or awards shall be 
granted with respect to any foreign military craft located in United States 
waters without the express permission of the relevant foreign state.”  Pub. 
L. 108-375, § 1406(c)(2) (2004).  Without Spain’s blessing, denial of 
Galleon’s permit application by NOAA was proper in order to abide by the 
explicit mandate of the SMCA. 
Additionally, NOAA denied Galleon’s permit to uphold the United 
States’s obligation under the 1902 Treaty. 33 Stat. 2105 (1903).  Section 
305 of the NMSA provides that regulations issued to designate and 
implement the Act “shall be applied in accordance with generalized 
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principles of international law, and in accordance with treaties, conventions, 
and other agreements to which the United States is a party.” 16 U.S.C. § 
1435(a); 15 C.F.R. § 922.4 (emphasis added).  The permitting provisions of 
the GCNMS Program Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 922.166, constitute 
“implementation” of the NMSA, and NOAA’s decisions on the issuance of 
Research and Recovery permits fall under the purview of the Act’s 
“application” as referenced in section 305.  According to the Congressional 
intent embodied in section 305 of the NMSA, NOAA shall not apply 
GCNMS regulations in contravention of existing international agreements 
to which the United States is a party. 16 U.S.C. § 1435(a).  As the district 
court found, Spain has not abandoned the wreck, and the 1902 Treaty 
applies to the shipwreck at issue.  (R. at 9.)  Therefore, NOAA’s denial of 
Galleon’s permit application was a valid rejection for the good cause of 
fulfillment of the 1902 Treaty. 
B.  The NMSA and the NMS Program Regulations Grant the Director 
Broad Discretion Over the Issuance of Permits. 
The NMSA, NMS Program Regulations, and GCNMS Regulations all 
grant the Secretary, Director, or administrator broad discretion over the 
permitting process.  Given the wide latitude Congress intended the admin-
istrator of the NMSA to have in issuing permits, NOAA’s permit decisions 
are entitled to the highest level of deference under arbitrary and capricious 
review. 
In the NMSA itself, Congress provided that the Secretary “may” issue 
special use permits “if the Secretary determines such authorization is 
necessary . . ..”  16 U.S.C. § 1441 (emphasis added).  Congress relied 
explicitly upon the judgment of the Secretary to identify when authorization 
for special use permits was necessary; the Secretary has since delegated this 
discretion to NOAA.  S. Rep. No. 595, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4387-88.  The 
general NMS Program Regulations issued to implement the NMSA follow 
Congressional intent by giving the Director significant autonomy in making 
permitting decisions.  During the application review process, the Director 
may request more information from an applicant and consult the views of 
others inside or outside the Federal government.  15 C.F.R. § 922.48(c).  
The Director then, “at his or her discretion, may issue a permit,” or “may 
deny a permit application . . . in whole or in part” if the applicant has 
violated the NMSA “or for other good cause.”  15 C.F.R. § 922.48(d); 15 
C.F.R. § 922.48(f).  The specific regulations for the GCNMS borrow the 
same discretionary language: the Director “at his or her discretion, may 
15
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issue a Research/Recovery of Historical Resources permit.”  15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(c)(2). 
The language of the NMSA itself and the regulations promulgated to 
implement it make the issuance of permits a matter of discretion, utilizing 
“may,” rather than the imperative, “shall,” throughout the text of the law.  
Because Congress conferred such discretion upon the administrator of the 
NMSA, the determinations NOAA made regarding Galleon’s permit may 
only be overturned if they are irrational and contrary to Congress’s intent 
under the NMSA.  See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 
898 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990).  Because NOAA considered the merits 
of Galleon’s permit application and denied it for good cause – in order to 
abide by existing laws and treaties of the United States – NOAA’s action 
was proper and this Court must defer to the agency’s decision. 
C.  NOAA’s Conclusion That the Sunken Ship Is of Spanish Origin 
Was Rationally Supported By the Record and Is Entitled to 
Deference. 
The good cause denial of Galleon’s Research and Recovery permit 
application by NOAA was predicated on NOAA’s preliminary 
determination that the ship was a sunken Spanish frigate.  This conclusion 
was rationally supported by the record before NOAA at the time, has not 
been discredited by more recent evidence, and is therefore entitled to 
deference.  Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
The Administrative Procedure Act requires a court to review the 
agency decision on the basis of the record before the agency when the 
decision was made.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).  As the district court noted, the 
“evidence presented to NOAA by Galleon implies and strongly suggests 
that the only ships that sank within the GCNMS within historic times were 
Spanish vessels”.  (R. at 12.)  Galleon presented no evidence that the wreck 
it had discovered was a ship belonging to any country other than Spain, or 
that ships other than Spanish ships even sank in the area of the GCNMS.  
Id.  The historic evidence presented to NOAA also did not imply that the 
wrecked ship belonged to a nation other than Spain.  Id.  Accordingly, 
based on the administrative record before NOAA during its review of 
Galleon’s application, the conclusion that the shipwreck was of Spanish 
origin was not implausible or counter to the evidence.  Motor Vehicle Mfr. 
Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
The district court also recognized that “all of the artifacts brought 
before this Court are of Spanish origin or are of the type that Spain typically 
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brought to its ports from Peru.”  (R. at 12.)  Although the character of 
artifacts brought before only the district court has no bearing on the 
propriety of NOAA’s decision, the fact that Galleon has been unable to 
present any artifact that implies the wreck is not of Spanish origin, even 
long after the agency decision, suggests NOAA’s conclusion was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious. 
IV.  GALLEON’S SALVAGE ACTIVITIES BOTH INSIDE AND 
OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE GCNMS 
REQUIRE AN NMSA PERMIT. 
Under the NMSA, it is illegal to “destroy, cause the loss of, or injure 
any sanctuary resource managed under law or regulations for that 
sanctuary.”  16 U.S.C. § 1436.  It is well established that historic 
shipwrecks constitute historical or cultural sanctuary resources.  15 C.F.R. § 
922.3. 
The GCNMS was established to “protect, preserve, and manage the 
conservation, ecological, recreational, research, educational, historical, and 
aesthetic resources and qualities of the area,” including historic shipwrecks.  
15 C.F.R. § 922.160(a).  To achieve this purpose, the GCNMS Regulations 
prohibit moving, removing, injuring, or possessing sanctuary historical 
resources except by those acting under a valid National Marine Sanctuary 
permit.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(9); 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(b).  Permits may 
be obtained by the procedures described in the NMS Program Regulations 
and the GCNMS Regulations.  15 C.F.R. § 922.48; 15 C.F.R. § 922.166. 
A.  Galleon’s Removal of Artifacts and “Mailbox” Excavation within 
the Boundaries of the GCNMS Require a Research and Recovery 
of Sanctuary Historical Resources Permit. 
The removal and possession of Sanctuary historical resources is 
prohibited by the GCNMS Regulations. 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(9).  
Cultural resources, including historic shipwrecks and artifacts, are a 
subcategory of historical resources within the definitions of the NMS 
Program Regulations.  15 C.F.R. § 922.3.  Therefore, any movement of, 
removal of, possession of, or injury to artifacts or other Sanctuary historical 
resources is a violation, in the absence of a GCNMS Research and 
Recovery of Sanctuary Historical Resources permit.  Galleon has already 
recklessly disregarded the Sanctuary’s clear prohibition and NOAA’s 
proper denial of its permit application by excavating and removing 
Sanctuary artifacts and bringing them before this Court.  If Galleon 
17
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continues its salvage and recovery activities upon the shipwreck within the 
GCNMS, it will continue to be in violation of these GCNMS Regulations.  
15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(9).  Galleon must be enjoined from further salvage 
of shipwrecks, artifacts, and other historical resources inside the boundaries 
of the GCNMS until it obtains a permit making its actions legal.  
Furthermore, the artifacts Galleon has removed from the Sanctuary to date 
must be returned to the GCNMS.  See U.S. v. Fisher, 977 F. Supp. 1193, 
1201 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
Galleon’s “mailbox” excavation technique is also prohibited by the 
regulations designed to protect the GCNMS.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(3),(5).  
“Mailboxes” are devices that redirect the powerful thrust of a ship’s engines 
downward toward the sea bottom in order to blast away the ocean floor and 
expose buried items.  See Fisher, 977 F. Supp. at 1196; (R. at 6.)  
Mailboxes “can excavate up to twenty-five feet of sand from the ocean 
bottom,” or “make a hole in sand thirty feet across and three to four feet 
deep in fifteen seconds.”  Fisher, 977 F. Supp. at 1196.  Due to the 
devastating impact mailbox excavation has on seagrasses, marine life, 
historical sites, and other sanctuary resources, the GCNMS prohibits 
“engaging in prop-dredging” except in limited circumstances that do not 
apply here.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(3).  The definition of “prop dredging” 
within the GCNMS Regulations explicitly includes “use of propulsion wash 
deflectors,” like those implemented in Galleon’s mailbox technique.  (R. at 
6); 15 C.F.R. §922.162.  Therefore, Galleon’s implementation of mailbox 
devices to blast away the seabottom is an express violation of the GCNMS 
prohibition on prop-dredging, and illegal inside the GCNMS boundaries 
without a valid permit. 
This Court must enjoin Galleon from further mailbox excavation 
inside the GCNMS in the absence of a Research and Recovery of Sanctuary 
Historical Resources permit issued under 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(c) of the 
GCNMS Regulations. 
B.  Galleon’s Salvage Activities outside the Boundaries of the GCNMS 
Require a Research and Recovery of Sanctuary Historical 
Resources Permit. 
The NMSA is ambiguous as to whether “sanctuary resources” subject 
to protection under the Act may lie partially outside the designated 
sanctuary boundaries.  When Congress delegates authority to an agency but 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue related to that 
authority, it is within the discretion of the agency to interpret the issue, 
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provided the agency interpretation is reasonable.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
1.  The NMSA definition of “sanctuary resource” is ambiguous. 
Congress defined “sanctuary resource” as any living or nonliving 
“resource of a national marine sanctuary” that contributes to the value of the 
sanctuary.  16 U.S.C. § 1432(8).  In using the phrase, “resource of a 
national marine sanctuary,” Congress intended a close connection between 
the sanctuary and the resource.  However, though Congress has used 
language limiting protected resources to those within geographic 
boundaries before, see 16 U.S.C. § 19jj(d), Congress did not mandate that 
the protected resource be entirely inside the sanctuary to qualify as a 
“sanctuary resource” under the NMSA.  The district court therefore erred in 
its conclusion that “jurisdiction of the United States extends only to the 
cargo found within the GCNMS.”  (R. at 12.) 
Congress chose to protect significant marine environments by 
designating certain areas for protection, but nowhere in the NMSA did 
Congress limit the scope of sanctuary resources to those geographically 
located within the lines drawn for the sanctuary.  See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-
1445.  Congress made it unlawful to “destroy, cause the loss of, or injure 
any sanctuary resource” without regard to where the destructive activity 
takes place; the only element Congress required was the causation between 
the activity and the harm to the sanctuary resource.  16 U.S.C. § 1436(1). 
2. The vessel and its cargo make up a single shipwreck and 
archeological site, and therefore NOAA’s interpretation of the 
site as a unitary sanctuary resource is reasonable. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “an agency, to engage in 
informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom 
of its policy on a continuing basis.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864.  After 
Galleon discovered artifacts from the Spanish wreck outside the boundaries 
of the GCNMS, it was entirely reasonable for NOAA to assert regulatory 
authority over what it interpreted to be a collection of material constituting 
a single sanctuary resource. 
Although the NMSA does not provide a definition for “shipwreck,” the 
Abandoned Shipwreck Act defines a shipwreck as “a vessel or wreck, its 
cargo, and other contents.”  43 U.S.C. § 2102(d).  Courts have recognized 
that a shipwreck does not consist solely of the sunken vessel and whatever 
remains inside the ship.  See Fisher, 977 F. Supp. at 1198.  In Fisher, the 
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court explained that shipwrecks typically consist of the primary cultural 
deposit where the ship itself lies at the bottom of the sea, secondary scatter 
of artifacts surrounding this site, and tertiary scatter of artifacts spread over 
an even broader area.  Id.  The relationships among the objects discovered 
throughout the scatter field of a shipwreck provide unique contextual 
information from which archeologists can glean invaluable insights into 
past cultures.  Id.  This contextual information is precisely one of the 
resources Congress intended to preserve when it recognized marine 
environments having “historical, scientific, educational, cultural, [and] 
archeological . . . significance” and acted to protect them by passing the 
NMSA.  16 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(2). 
Under the NMS Program Regulations, “shipwrecks” and 
“archeological sites” are specifically enumerated within the definition of 
“cultural resources,” a subset of historical sanctuary resources entitled to 
protection. 15 C.F.R. § 922.3.  The sunken Spanish vessel and its cargo 
constitute both a single “shipwreck” and a single “archeological site,” and 
therefore, all elements of the wreck, including the vessel, its cargo, and the 
remains of its passengers form a single sanctuary resource under the 
NMSA.  NOAA’s interpretation of its delegated authority as including the 
entire Spanish shipwreck was a permissible, rational view entitled to 
Chevron deference. 
Galleon’s salvage and recovery activities outside the boundaries of the 
sanctuary “destroy, cause the loss of, [and] injure” the contextual 
information associated with a GCNMS sanctuary resource – the Spanish 
shipwreck and the archaeological site it represents.  Galleon must obtain a 
Research and Recovery of Historical Sanctuary Resources permit before 
conducting further excavation or recovery of the wreck and its cargo, even 
outside the boundaries of the GCNMS. 
V. THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE DID NOT ACT 
ARBITRARILY OR CAPRICIOUSLY IN DENYING 
GALLEON AN ENDANGERED SPECIES PERMIT TO 
DRILL THROUGH ENDANGERED DEEP SEA CORAL 
WITHIN THE GCNMS. 
The district court properly concluded that the Secretary’s denial of 
Galleon’s Endangered Species permit was neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
As the court noted, the deep sea coral within the GCNMS has been listed as 
an endangered species, and is therefore entitled to the protections provided 
by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599 (2006).  (R. 
at 13.)  Although the ESA authorizes the Secretary to issue permits 
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exempting applicants from ESA protections in limited circumstances, 
Galleon’s proposed plan to drill through endangered deep sea coral to 
salvage a historic wreck within a national marine sanctuary is not such an 
exception.  Because drilling through coral inside the GCNMS is unlawful, 
the Secretary had no statutory authority to issue Galleon a permit for this 
activity.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
Denial of an EPA permit application is final agency action subject to 
judicial review under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.  Oregon 
Natural Resources Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).  
If there is no clear error of judgment and “a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made,” the court cannot overturn the agency’s 
determination.  Id. 
A.   Drilling through Endangered Deep Sea Coral Is a “Taking” of the 
Coral under the Endangered Species Act. 
Section 9 of the ESA makes it unlawful to “take” any listed 
endangered species within the territorial seas of the United States or on the 
high seas.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C). The Endangered Species Act 
defines “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”  16 U.S.C. 
§ 1532.  Courts have recognized that Congress intended “take” to be 
interpreted “in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable 
way in which a person can ‘take’ or attempt to ‘take’ any fish or wildlife.”  
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (quoting S.Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)).  
Galleon’s plan to drill through endangered deep sea coral, tearing through 
the coral with a drill bit to access the sunken vessel beneath, would clearly 
“harm” or “wound” the coral displaced by the drill and the surrounding 
coral.  It therefore constitutes a “taking” under the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1532. 
B.    Drilling through Coral Is Unlawful under GCNMS Regulations. 
The GCNMS Regulations explicitly prohibit “removal of, injury to, or 
possession of coral or live rock,” including  “moving, removing, taking, 
harvesting, damaging, disturbing, breaking, cutting, or otherwise injuring. . 
.any living or dead coral. . .”.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(2).  NOAA 
promulgated this regulation as a sanctuary-specific implementation of the 
NMSA prohibition on destruction, loss, or injury to sanctuary resources.  
See 16 U.S.C. § 1436.  Galleon’s intention to access the remains of the 
sunken vessel by drilling through the coral formations presently burying it 
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would necessarily involve at least “moving,” “removing,” “damaging,” 
“disturbing,” or “otherwise injuring” the coral.  If effectuated, Galleon’s 
plan would violate one or more of the prohibitions protecting all living and 
dead coral formations within the Sanctuary.  Drilling through the 
endangered deep sea coral would therefore be an unlawful activity. 
C.  The Secretary of Commerce Properly Denied Galleon the ESA 
Permit Because the Secretary May Only Issue Permits for 
Scientific Purposes or Takings Incidental to Otherwise Lawful 
Activity. 
The ESA authorizes the Secretary to issue permits exempting the 
applicants from the prohibitions of section 9 for two purposes: (A) to 
facilitate scientific goals, inapplicable here, or (B) to allow takings 
“incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise 
lawful activity.”  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1).  These are the only two 
circumstances in which the Secretary may issue permits exempting parties 
from ESA prohibitions. 
Drilling through endangered deep sea coral inside the GCNMS, as 
Galleon’s plan involves, is not an “otherwise lawful activity” because it is 
explicitly prohibited by GCNMS regulations. 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(2).  
Galleon has not obtained a GCNMS Research and Recovery permit from 
NOAA and therefore cannot claim its drilling is a lawful activity as 
required by the ESA permit provision.  The decision of the Secretary of 
Commerce to deny Galleon’s permit application was based on rational logic 
applying the facts of the case to the ESA permitting provisions.  The 
Secretary committed no abuse of discretion in denying Galleon the ESA 
permit to drill through endangered coral in violation of GCNMS 
regulations.  In fact, the ESA does not authorize the Secretary to issue the 
contested permit. 
VI. GALLEON NEEDS PERMITS FROM BOTH THE U.S. 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY TO 
SALVAGE LA CONTESTA. 
Galleon’s salvage operations of La Contesta fall under the purview of 
two separate environmental protection statutes: (A) the Rivers and Harbors 
Act (“RHA”), involving a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers 
(“Corps”), and (B) the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), involving permitting 
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schemes under both the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”). 
A.  The Rivers and Harbors Act Requires That Galleon Obtain a 
Permit From the Corps of Engineers. 
“The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by 
Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United 
States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the 
building of any . . . pier . . . or other structures in any . . . canal . . . or other 
water of the United States . . . except on plans recommended by the Chief 
of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army . . ..” 33 U.S.C. § 
403 (2008).  Thus, “a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers is required 
for the installation of any structure in the nation’s navigable waters which 
may interfere with navigation, including piers, docks, and ramps.” PUD No. 
1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 722 (1994).  As a whole, 
Section 10 of the RHA has been repeatedly stressed by the Supreme Court 
to be read broadly. United States v. MCC, 772 F.2d 1501, 1504 (11th Cir. 
1985) (citing United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 
(1960)).  Galleon’s drilling platform is (1) a structure that obstructs (2) 
navigable waters of the United States and (3) interferes with their 
navigability. 
1.  Galleon’s drilling platform is a structure and an obstruction. 
Although the RHA enumerates a number of particular banned 
structures, which the Secretary of the Army may approve, Section 10’s 
generalized first clause, which prohibits “the creation of any obstruction not 
affirmatively authorized by Congress [means] that Congress planned to ban 
any type of ‘obstruction,’ not merely those specifically made subject to 
approval by the Secretary of the Army.” MCC, 722 F.2d at 1505 (quoting 
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1960)).  The 
RHA’s enumeration of objects presumed to be obstructions is non-
exhaustive, United States v. Members of Estate of Boothby, 16 F.3d 19, 21 
(1st Cir. 1994) (citing Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 486-87), and the Boothby 
court read the statute to include boathouses that the Corps determined to be 
sufficiently permanently moored to constitute obstructions. Id.; see also id. 
at 24 (obstructions need not be structures; Section 10 permit required so 
long as an object can plausibly be deemed an obstruction to navigation).  
The district court’s finding of an RHA violation by Galleon necessitates a 
finding that the drilling platform, which must be stably moored to excavate 
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in rough seas, is an obstruction comparable to the Boothby boathouses, and 
this finding of fact is accorded deference on appeal. 
2.  Galleon’s platform is in the navigable waters of the United 
States. 
“The navigable waters of the United States over which Corps of 
Engineers regulatory jurisdiction extends include all ocean and coastal 
waters within a zone three geographic (nautical) miles seaward from the 
baseline (The Territorial Seas). Wider zones are recognized for special 
regulatory powers exercised over the outer continental shelf.” 33 C.F.R. § 
329.12(a) (citing 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(b)).  “[Corps] permits are required for 
the construction of artificial islands, installations, and other devices on the 
seabed, to the seaward limit of the outer continental shelf.” 33 C.F.R. § 
322.3(b); see also 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(b) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e)).  The 
outer continental shelf extends seaward and outside of the area of lands 
beneath navigable waters. See 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (citing § 1301(b) (“in no 
event shall the term “boundaries” or the term “lands beneath navigable 
waters” be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three 
geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more 
than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico”)).  The seaward limit of 
the outer continental shelf is two hundred nautical miles, which covers La 
Contesta. 60 Fed. Reg. 43,825 (Aug. 23, 1995). 
3.  Galleon’s platform interferes with navigation. 
Corps regulations define navigable waters to include those waters of 
the United States that have been used in the past to transport foreign 
commerce. United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(citing 33 C.F.R. § 329.4).  There is no doubt that the waters in which La 
Contesta lies are navigable waters; the very transport of foreign commerce 
led to the creation of the shipwreck.  The “possibility of interference” is 
also an extremely low standard, id., and the district court here necessarily 
found as a matter of fact that Galleon’s drilling platform creates the 
possibility of interference with navigation.  This finding requires deference 
by this Court on appeal. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/15
BB_SPAIN_26.2 7/27/2009  6:08 PM 
2009] BEST BRIEF: THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN 649 
B.   The Clean Water Act Established Two Permitting Schemes, One 
Under The Authority of the Corps of Engineers and the Other 
Under the Environmental Protection Agency, and Both Permits 
Apply to Galleon’s Salvage Operations of La Contesta. 
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) generally prohibits the discharging 
without a permit of pollutants by any person. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); see also 
§ 1362(5) (person includes corporations, such as Galleon).  A discharge is 
“any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the 
ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.”  § 
1362(12)(B); see also United States v. W. Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 
299, 307-08 (3d Cir. 1997).  Galleon’s employment of the mailbox prop-
wash is regulated under the CWA because it constitutes (1) the addition of 
(2) pollutants (3) into the contiguous zone (4) from a point source other 
than a vessel or other floating craft. 
1. Galleon’s mailbox and drilling activities constitute addition. 
The re-depositing of materials into the same body of water is sufficient 
to constitute addition. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 947-
48 (7th Cir. 2004).  As the Seventh Circuit noted, the courts of appeals have 
generally adopted this broader interpretation in contrast to older case law 
holding that pollutants can only be added from the outside world. Id.; 
compare United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (“It is 
of no consequence that what is now dredged spoil was previously present 
on the same property in the less threatening form of dirt and vegetation in 
an undisturbed state. What is important is that once that material was 
excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in that same wetland added a 
pollutant where none had been before.”); Catskill Mountains Chapter of 
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 
2001); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923-24 
& n.43 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that “‘dredged’ material is by definition 
material that comes from the water itself,” and that “[a] requirement that all 
pollutants must come from outside sources would effectively remove the 
dredge-and-fill provision from the statute”); Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
MCC, 772 F.2d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985); Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 
1276, 1285 (9th Cir.1990) (dirt and gravel extracted by gold miners and re-
deposited into the stream bed from which it was extracted constituted an 
“addition” of a pollutant under the Clean Water Act), with Nat’l Wildlife 
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Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988). 
According to the Seventh Circuit, “such a reading is compatible with 
the purpose of the CWA to ‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’” Greenfield Mills, 361 F.3d at 
948-49 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).  It is quite logical that sediment and 
vegetation removed from the seabed of a body of water where they 
naturally belong and mixed into the water above disturb the ecological 
balance of the water. See id. (citing Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 924 n.43.)).  
Galleon’s mailbox prop washing of seabed sediments and drilling of coral, 
even though all materials remain within the same body of water, therefore 
nonetheless constitute addition. 
2. The seabed sediment, seagrasses, and coral constitute pollutants. 
Under the CWA, pollutant includes “dredged spoil, solid waste, . . . 
biological materials, . . . rock, [and] sand.” Greenfield Mills, 361 F.3d at 
947 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2008)).  The separate permitting schemes 
arise from the type of pollutant: (a) dredged spoil are pollutants whose 
discharge require permitting from the Corps and (b) all other pollutants that 
are not dredged spoil require discharge permits from the EPA under the 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”). 
a. The seabed sediment and seagrasses that Galleon dredged 
through its mailbox are dredged materials that require 
permitting from the Corps under § 404 of the CWA. 
Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for dredged materials. 33 
U.S.C. § 1344 (2008).  Dirt and vegetation from bottom of wetlands 
constitute dredged spoil. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2000).  It 
is unnecessary for the court determine whether the dredged spoil and its re-
introduction to the water caused any harm; Congress had legislated as a rule 
of law that even “plain dirt, once excavated from waters of the United 
States, could not be redeposited into those waters without causing harm to 
the environment.” Id. at 336.  “Even in a pristine wetland or body of water, 
the discharge of dredged spoil, rock, sand, and biological materials 
threatens to increase the amount of suspended sediment, harming aquatic 
life.” Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.41(b)).  Regardless, such review would 
only be possible if Galleon had undertaken the proper permitting scheme 
and allowed for the Corps or EPA to make the first determinations. See 
Kelly v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Driving a car without a 
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license is not necessarily dangerous, but it is illegal. Likewise, digging eight 
pits in a marsh might not cause massive environmental trauma, but doing so 
without a permit violates the Clean Water Act.”).  Lastly, there is nothing 
strange about needing two separate permits under the separate statutes of 
the RHA and the CWA from the same agency of the COE concerning the 
same course of conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 
992 (9th Cir. 2007). 
A party may be exempt from the § 404 permit requirement by showing 
that it falls under one of the provisions in § 1344(f)(1) and that its activities 
do not fall within the “recapture” provision, § 1344(f)(2). “Read together 
the two parts of Section 404(f) provide a narrow exemption for . . . 
activities that have little or no adverse effect on the waters of the U.S.” 
United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir.1994). The defendants 
bear the burden of establishing both that they qualify for one of the 
exemptions of § 1344(f)(1) and that their actions are not recaptured by § 
1344(f)(2). Greenfield Mills, 361 F.3d at 949.  It should also be noted that 
because the appellants did not raise any exemption argument before the 
district court, this Court reviews any arguments for exemption by a clearly 
erroneous standard. 
b. The coral that Galleon drilled through and broke off are 
biological materials that require permitting from the EPA 
through the NPDES under § 402 of the CWA. 
Section 402 of the CWA requires a permit under the NPDES from the 
EPA for non-dredge pollutants such as biological materials. 33 U.S.C. § 
1342 (2008).  Human blood constitutes pollutant biological materials. 
United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1993); 
see also Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 218 n.148 (5th Cir. 
1989) (algae is pollutant as a biological material and as a “man-made or 
man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and 
radiological integrity of water” (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19))).  The coral 
broken off by Galleon, as detailed supra in Sec. V of this brief, are live 
biological materials for which permitting by EPA through NPDES is 
therefore required. 
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3.  The waters in which La Contesta is located are in the contiguous 
zone of the United States and are therefore regulable under the 
CWA. 
The contiguous zone as regulated by the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(12)(B) (2008), “means the entire zone established or to be established 
by the United States under article 24 of the Convention of the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone.” § 1362(9).  Art. 24 held that “[t]he 
contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”  However, under 
the Art. 33 of the UNCLOS, “The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 
24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.”  Although the United States never ratified 
UNCLOS, it treats many provisions of the UNCLOS as customary 
international law.  Additionally, President Clinton declared that “[t]he 
contiguous zone of the United States extends to 24 nautical miles from the 
baselines of the United States.” Proclamation No. 7219, 64 F.R. 48701 
(Aug. 2, 1999).  The area in which Galleon is conducting salvage operations 
is, as found by the district court, between 23 and 24 nautical miles off the 
coast of New Union, and therefore is within the contiguous zone of the 
United States. 
4. Galleon’s drilling platform constitutes a point source for 
discharging pollutants. 
The term “point source” means any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, 
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal 
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants 
are or may be discharged. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2008).  However, where 
the discharge occurs in the contiguous zone, vessels and other floating craft 
are exempt from coverage as point sources. § 1362(12)(B).  Because (a) 
Galleon’s drilling platform is not a vessel, (b) it is a conveyance that 
constitutes a point source regulable under the CWA. 
a.  The drilling platform is not a vessel and therefore is not exempt 
from the CWA’s exemption of vessels in the contiguous zone. 
Although vessels and other floating craft are excluded from regulation 
in the contiguous zone, only watercraft that have potential as means of 
transportation on water are considered vessels. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2008).  
Drilling platforms that remain semi-fixed and serve no purpose as a means 
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of transportation are generally not considered to be vessels. See, e.g., 30 
U.S.C. § 1419(e) (2008) (“[A]ny vessel or other floating craft engaged in 
commercial recovery or exploration shall not be deemed to be ‘a vessel or 
other floating craft’ under section 502(12)(B) of the Clean Water Act and 
any discharge of a pollutant from such vessel or other floating craft shall be 
subject to the Clean Water Act.”); Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 
182 F.3d 340, 347 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that drilling platforms are not 
vessels). 
The two main factors in determining whether a craft is a vessel are 
“the purpose for which the craft is constructed and the business in which it 
is engaged.” Manuel v. P.A.W. Drilling & Well Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 344, 
350 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 30 
(1903)).  “If the owner constructs or assembles a craft for the purpose of 
transporting passengers, cargo, or equipment across navigable waters and 
the craft is engaged in that service, that structure is a vessel.” Id.  “In the 
occasional case where the intended purpose of the craft is not clear, our 
cases have recognized that other factors may be relevant. These include the 
intention of the owner to move the structure on a regular basis and the 
length of time that the structure has remained stationary.” Id.  “In all of our 
work platform cases, the transportation function of the craft at issue was 
merely incidental to its primary purpose of serving as a work platform.” Id. 
at 351.  Being moored more or less permanently to the water bottom is a 
good indicator of not being a vessel. Id. at 351 n.9.  “These drilling rigs and 
other special purpose craft do more than merely float on navigable waters 
and serve as work platforms. Instead, an important part of their function 
includes transporting passengers, cargo, or equipment across navigable 
waters.” Id. at 351. 
Whether the drilling platform constitutes a vessel is a question of fact 
which resolution by the fact-finder receives deference on appeal, see 
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 492 n.6 (2005) (citing Sw. 
Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 92 (2005)), and because the district 
court necessarily found that Galleon’s platform is not a vessel, this court 
should only reverse that finding for clear error.  Because no evidence exists 
on the record suggesting that Galleon’s platform served any transportation 
purpose, the district court’s finding should stand. 
b. The drilling platform is a conveyance constituting a point source. 
The point source itself need not be the originator of the pollutant.  
“Tellingly, the examples of “point sources” listed by the Act include pipes, 
ditches, tunnels, and conduits, objects that do not themselves generate 
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pollutants but merely transport them.” S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 104 (2004) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(14) (2008)).  Noting that the definition of a point source is to be 
broadly interpreted, the Second Circuit held that “manure spreading 
vehicles themselves were point sources. The collection of liquid manure 
into tankers and their discharge on fields from which the manure directly 
flows into navigable waters are point source discharges under the case law.” 
Concerned Area Residents for the Env. v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 
119 (2d Cir. 1994).  Therefore, as found by the district court, Galleon’s 
prop deflectors, which direct the current of water that hits the seabed and 
becomes polluted by the discharged sediment and seagrasses, and Galleon’s 
drill, which breaks apart and discharges coral into the surrounding waters, 
are point sources of pollutant discharge. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we ask this Court to affirm the district 
court’s holding that (1) the United States properly denied Galleon’s NMSA 
and EPA permit applications, and (2) Galleon’s unauthorized salvage 
operations required Corps and EPA permits.  This Court should reverse the 
trial court’s remaining conclusions, and hold (1) the SMCA applies to the 
wreck and Galleon can obtain no salvage award without Spain’s consent, 
and (2) recovery of this historical shipwreck, inside and outside GCNMS 
boundaries, requires an NMSA permit. 
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